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BECAUSE FOREVER IS TOO LONG
AUSHER M. B. KOFSKY*
INTRODUCTION
Is tax fraud worse than sexual molestation of children? Federal and
state legislatures limit the government’s time to prosecute nearly all
heinous offenses, including that particular evil.1 Yet Congress provides
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with unlimited time to prosecute
allegations of tax fraud, false returns, and instances of non-filed tax
returns.2 This Article contends that the incongruent unlimited tax writ is
no longer, if it ever was, appropriate.
Consider the following hypothetical example based on a real case.
Imagine a small business operator, in his late eighties, with his health
* Ausher M. B. Kofsky, MBA, CPA, JD, LLM, Assistant Professor, Western New
England (WNE) University, College of Business, Department of Accounting and Finance. I
deeply thank my parents Bert D. Butler and Sylvia K. Butler, my wife Paulette S. W. Kofsky,
and my children for their loving encouragement during preparation of the Article. My father,
cited above, age 92, a still active Certified Public Accountant, shared perspectives from more
than 65 years of experience working with the Internal Revenue Service. I also thank William
D. Metzger, Patricia Newcombe, and Martin D. O’Conner for helping to shape the themes of
this project; Sarah A. Hill, Renee Y. Rastorfer, Liza Rosenof, Mary Jane Sobinski-Smith for
superb research assistance; and Jessica Scouten for excellent editorial review. Further, I also
thank the following individuals for their valuable ideas during a discussion of the Article at
the faculty forum on January 21, 2015, at WNE University School of Law: Erin E. Buzuvis,
Matthew H. Charity, Samuel L. Charron, Beth D. Cohen, Harris Freeman, Arthur R. Gaudio,
Bruce K. Miller, Liza Rosenof, Sudha N. Setty, and Paula M. Zimmer. Finally, special
gratitude goes to Sudha N. Setty, who at each step in the process provided guidance without
which this Article would not have been possible.
1. See Twersky v. Yeshiva University, 579 Fed. App’x. 7 (2nd Cir. 2014), aff’d 993 F.
Supp. 2d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (in conspicuous contrast to the unlimited time to investigate
allegations of tax fraud discussed throughout this Article, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit recently upheld the dismissal of a $680 million lawsuit for sexual abuse
of students by faculty of a high school). See generally 993 F. Supp. 2d at 432-433 (the
plaintiffs, 34 former high school students, alleged that three faculty members, one of whom
who became the high school’s principal, abused the boys from the 1970 through the 1990s).
The Court ruled “all of the claims in the Complaint are prima facie time-barred.” Id. at 436
(emphasis added). Similarly, in Massachusetts, the statute of limitations for indictment on
murder is unlimited, 27 years from the date of the crime for rape of a child; 10 years for armed
robbery; and 6 years for all other crimes. See, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 277 § 63 (2012).
2. This Article interchangeable refers to the person or party holding the power to assess
a tax as the Commissioner, the Crown, the Executive, the Government, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), the King, or the Sovereign.
265
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and mental capacity slipping. He continued to prepare the business’s
payroll reports himself, refusing to let family or professionals help him.3
Total payroll was around $125,000 per year. Minor reporting errors
began to creep, such as a $1,000 discrepancy in one year’s year-end
payroll reports. This particular error should have resulted in the owner
owing at most $153 for 15.3 percent FICA tax on $1,000. The business
owner, however, ignored, did not understand, or no longer had the ability
to correct the errors, contact the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or take
any action. Years went by fast. The IRS eventually discovered the
mistakes and determined a ten percent penalty under the section 6721
punishment for intentional disregard of information reporting reports.4
Unfortunately, the section 6721 penalty is 10 percent of the total
payroll, not just 10 percent of the tax deficiency. Consequently, by near
the end of the owner’s life, the penalties and interest accumulated for a
three-year period to nearly $100,000 from a tax base that was more than
twenty times smaller. The owner could not understand how the
government’s penalties could be so large, and did not have the financial
or mental state to seek help. The IRS ultimately garnished the owner’s
pension from a prior long-time job, and liened the owner’s modest
estate. This left his children and grandchildren nothing despite a lifetime
of hard work and modest living.
The issue of limitless tax investigations came to a fore recently
because of two seemingly unrelated lawsuits. In one event, a court
tossed out a suit by nearly three-dozen former high school students who
alleged that three of their teachers had sexually molested students over
three decades.5 Significant here, the court dismissed their suit as being
“prima facie time barred.”6
In sharp contrast, on April 10, 2013, Sumner Redstone (Redstone)
filed a petition in what became Redstone v. Commissioner, (hereinafter
Redstone).7 Redstone contested a notice of deficiency dated January 11,
2013.8 The notice determined that Redstone owed about $1.1 million in
tax and penalty, plus interest.9 Per the notice, Redstone did not file a gift
3. Payroll reports include Form 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return, Form
W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, and Form W-3, Transmittal of Wage and Tax Statements.
4. 26 U.S.C. § 6721(e)(2)(A) (2012).
5. Twersky v. Yeshiva University, 579 Fed. App’x. 7 (2nd Cir. 2014), aff’d 993 F.
Supp. 2d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
6. Id.
7. Amended Petition, Redstone v. Commissioner, (2014) (No. 8097-13) (referencing the
Notice of Deficiency attached to Redstone’s petition).
8. Id.
9. Id. Specifically the Notice of Deficiency determined that Redstone owed $738,000 in
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tax return and, similarly, did not pay gift tax on his transfer of stock to
trusts for his two children.10
The type of determination that the Commissioner made in Redstone
was unremarkable. What was unusual was the timing of the notice.
Redstone had transferred the stock in question in 1972.11 Thus, the
determination did not occur until forty-one years after the transfer.12 By
then, Redstone was nearly ninety years old.13
The reason that the Commissioner could reach back that far is that
sections 6501(e)(1)-(3), (9) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides
the Sovereign with an unlimited time to determine a deficiency arising
from fraud, a false tax return, or where the taxpayer has not filed a tax
return.14 In Redstone, the Commissioner alleged fraud as well as lack of
filing a gift tax return.15
Forty years or 140 years would not have mattered. All periods of
time are fair game, especially considering that transferee liability can
extend the liability to the next generation(s).16
The disparate treatment of limitations periods in the two cases lead
to the following question of societal priorities: does our society truly
want to protect its purse better than its children? This article analyzes
that disturbing incongruity by focusing on the reasons behind the
unlimited tax statute. The Article concludes that Congress should bring
tax investigations in line with most other laws by enacting a reasonable
limit on tax investigations.
That seemingly modest proposal, however, engenders strong
gift tax and $369,000 in a fraud penalty under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 6653(b); 26
U.S.C. § 6653(b) (2014).
10. Amended Petition, Redstone v. Commissioner, (2014) (No. 8097-13). The Notice
of Deficiency on Schedule Two, page one, determined that Redstone made simultaneous gifts
of National Amusements, Inc., stock, each gift worth $1.25 million, to trusts for his son Brent
and to his daughter Shari.
11. Id. The Notice of Deficiency stated the transfer occurred in the tax year ending
September 1972. Likewise, Redstone’s Amended Petition, filed Feb. 28, 2014, stated the
alleged transfer occurred during the period ending Sept. 30, 1972.
12. The duration is a similar magnitude to the biblical forty-year wanderings of the
Israelite nation. See Deuteronomy-Devarim- 1:3. See also Exodus-Shemot 16:35.
13. Redstone, supra note 7 (stating that the transfer occurred in the tax year ending
Sept. 1972). Likewise, Redstone stated the alleged transfer occurred during the period ending
Sept. 30, 1972. Id. Specifically. the Commissioner determined that Redstone owed $738,000
in gift tax and $369,000 in a fraud penalty under IRC § 6653(b); 26 U.S.C. § 6653(b) (2014).
14. Unless otherwise specified, IRC in this article refers to Title 26 of the United States
Code of 1986, as amended, entitled the Internal Revenue Code.
15. See Redstone, supra note 7.
16. 26 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000) (allowing the Commissioner in certain circumstances to
collect unpaid tax from a transferee when collection from the transferor is unavailable).
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reactions. Scholars contend that laws should not enable rich people or
cheats to prosper. On the other hand, other similarly intelligent people
perceive that an unlimited investigation period sets a Damocles sword of
unchecked government power hanging over the heads of ordinary
citizens. For the reasons discussed below, this Article agrees with the
latter group, and urges Congress to enact a reasonable limit on the
Sovereign’s time to investigate tax matters related to fraud, false returns,
or non-filed returns.
Reasonable minds can differ as to what assessment period would be
appropriate. This Article suggests that ten years is the correct statute of
repose to apply. The Article, however, proposes an interim ceiling of
twenty-one years until the new policy has had a trial period and until the
government can adopt new procedures. Notwithstanding, whatever is
the correct period, the point is that forever is too long.
Section II of this Article reviews the current law, discusses the
legislative history, and analyzes Congress’s original rationales for an
unlimited period. Section III reviews the main equitable and statutory
doctrines on limitations of actions. Section IV analyzes the pros and
cons of a finite assessment period. Section V lays out the Article’s
proposal in further detail, offering a new way forward to balance the
competing policy concerns at stake here. Section VI brings the analysis
back to the Redstone case to illustrate the many pitfalls of continuing
with a system that enables unrestricted investigations.
I. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE STATUTES LIMITING ASSESSMENTS
This section analyzes the status, history, and original purpose of the
Internal Revenue Code’s sections related to limitations on assessments.
A. Current Provisions
Below are the pertinent provisions of the Code. Section 6501,
entitled “Limitations on Assessment and Collection,” contains these
provisions.17
The law’s general rule is that the Commissioner has three years to
assess a tax after the taxpayer has filed a return or after the due date of
the return, whichever is later.18 In circumstances where the taxpayer has
omitted more than twenty-five percent of gross income, the
Commissioner’s scope expands to six years.19 As pertinent here, when
17. 26 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a)-(b)(1) (2012).
19. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1) (2012). For estate and gift transfer taxes, see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 6501(e)(2) (2012).
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the taxpayer commits fraud, files a false return, or fails to file a tax
return, the Commissioner can assess a tax “at any time.”20 Similarly, the
Code separately repeats the unlimited period for unreported gift tax.
Namely, if a taxpayer fails to report a gift for which the taxpayer would
have owed a gift tax, the Commissioner can also assess “at any time.”21
B. Legislative History
This section discusses Congress’ evolution to the current unlimited
assessment period. After prior intermittent federal impositions of
income tax, beginning in 1862 with the American Civil War, the saga
began in earnest with the States’ ratification of Article XVI amending
the United States Constitution.22 The Sixteenth Amendment, which the
U.S. Secretary of State certified on February 25, 1913, made
constitutional the federal government’s authority to impose income
taxes.23
Specifically, the Sixteenth Amendment provided that “[t]he
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”24 “Whatever
source derived” includes all accretion to a person’s wealth with the
exception of adoption expense reimbursements, child support payments,
gifts received, bequests, inheritances, workers’ compensation benefits,
meals and lodging for the convenience of your employer, compensatory
damages awarded for physical injury or sickness, welfare benefits, and
cash rebates from a dealer or manufacturer.25
Congress wasted no time in addressing assessments. In the
preamble to the statutes in the Revenue Act of 1913, also known as the
Underwood Tariff Act, Congress provided a three-year limit for the
Commissioner to assess a non-filed, false, or fraudulent returns, as
follows:
20. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(1)-(3) (2012).
21. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(9) (2010).
22. See Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, §§ 89-93, 12 Stat. 432, 473-75 (1862) (enacting
a 3% tax on “annual gains, profits, or income of every person residing in the United States”
above $600, with 5% rate applicable over $10,000). U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Ratified
Amendments, 1795-1992; General Records of the United States Government; Record Group
11; National Archives, available at 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Federal Income
Tax (1913), 100 Milestone Documents, OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.php?doc=57 (last visited May 26, 2015).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
24. Id.
25. Taxable or Non-Taxable Income?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Taxable-or-Non-Taxable-Income%3F.
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E. That all assessments shall be made by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and all persons shall be notified of the amount for
which they are respectively liable on or before the first day of June
of each successive year, and said assessments shall be paid on or
before the thirtieth day of June, except in cases of refusal or neglect
to make such return and in cases of false or fraudulent returns, in
which cases the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall, upon the
discovery thereof, at any time within three years after said return is
due, make a return upon information obtained as provided for in this
26
section or by existing law . . . .

The first instance of unlimited time for assessment appears to have
arisen just five years later in the Revenue Act of 1918.27 The Act both
extended the time for a regular assessment to five years and added for
the first time the “at any time” language at issue here, as follows:
(d) Except in the case of false or fraudulent returns with intent to
evade the tax, the amount of tax due under any return shall be
determined and assessed by the Commissioner within five years after
the return was due or was made, and no suit or proceeding for the
collection of any tax shall be begun after the expiration of five years
after the date when the return was due or was made. In the case of
such false or fraudulent returns, the amount of tax due may be
determined at any time after the return is filed, and the tax may be
28
collected at any time after it becomes due.

C. Congressional Rationales for Unlimited Assessments
Unfortunately, a search of the Committee reports did not reveal an
explanation of the 1918 Revenue Act’s change to unlimited
assessments.29 This Article, however, speculates that three factors

26. Sixty-Third Congress. Sess. I. Chs. 15, 16 (38 Stat. 114, 1913), The Statutes at
Large of the United States of America, from March 1913 to March 1915, Volume XXXVIII,
Part 1, p. 169.
27. A year-by-year statutory review forms this conclusion. See first inclusion in SixtyFifth Congress. Sess. III. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1083 (1919), The Statutes at Large of the United
States of America, from April 1917 to March 1919, vol. XL, § 250(d). The Supreme Court, in
dicta, appears to confirm this timing. See Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 393 n.7 (1984)
(“Under every general income tax statute since 1918, the filing of a false or fraudulent return
has indefinitely extended the period of limitations for assessment of tax.”). See Revenue Act
of 1918, § 250(d), 40 Stat. 1083. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(d), 40 Stat. 1083 (1919).
28. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(d), 40 Stat. 1083 (1919).
29. Bryan T. Camp, Tax Return Preparer Fraud and the Assessment Limitation Period,
116 TAX NOTES 687 (2007) [hereinafter Camp’s Compendium] (noting the lack of committee
reports by explaining that “[t]he first change [the change to unlimited assessments] is, I hope,
self-explanatory (especially since there is not a word about it in the committee reports that I
could find).”).
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motivated Congress. These factors relate to the United States history of
income taxation that the text below summarizes.
1. Revenue to Finance U.S. Participation in World War I
One major cause relates to Congress’ goal in implementing the first
income tax. That goal was to help fund the Civil War.30 Similarly, when
Congress implemented the limitless assessment period through the
Revenue Act of 1918, the United States was again deep in military
expenditures. The United States had occupied Haiti beginning in 1915,
and America became heavily involved in World War I, officially
declaring war in 1917.31
Evidence of the urgent financial need includes the following. The
Committee on Ways and Means report that accompanied the 1918
Revenue Act unmistakably identified the war’s exigent revenue need.
For instance, the opening subtitle begins by stating that, “[t]he first
problem i[s] determining our fiscal policy to finance this war.”32 The
report goes on to state that imperative need for additional revenue, as
follows:
On May 27, 1918, the President address[ed] the Congress in joint
session and recommended that the Congress set to work immediately
to draft the new revenue measure and recommended that the
necessary additional taxes be secured from war profits, incomes, and
luxuries. . . .
The Committee on Ways and Means announce to all concerned that
it will hold public hearings at Washington, D.C., beginning June 6,
1918. It is deemed necessary large to increase the revenue from
taxation. It seems to the committee that it will be necessary to raise
the necessary increased revenue chiefly from taxes upon incomes,
excess of war profits, luxuries, and semi-luxuries. In the preparation
of the new tax measure the committee will give careful consideration
to all suggestions with reference to the measure, together with
33
suggestions of other revenue sources.

Similarly, or perhaps even more so, a special news report in the

30. Id.
31. The United States invaded Haiti in July 1915 following the assassination of Haiti’s
President. U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34, Milestones: 1914-1920, OFFICE
OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/19141920/haiti (last visited April 10, 2015). Similarly, the United States had officially declared
war on the Axis Powers on December 7, 1917, signaling the U.S.’s official entry into the war.
Id.
32. H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 1 (1918).
33. Id. at 2.
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New York Times detailed the fiscal urgency, as follows:
The largest revenue raising bill in the history of this or any other
nation was unanimously reported to the House today by
Representative Claude Kitchin, Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, which drafted the measure after public hearings and
daily executive sessions covering three months. . . .
The bill follows closely the taxation sources of the last two revenue
laws, increasing the rates greatly in most cases and correcting
34
inequities of the present laws.

2. Change in Tax Administration Methodology
A second probable factor related to the implementation of an
unlimited assessment period arose as a curative to the federal
government’s prior tax administration practices. The nation’s initial
primary revenue sources were customs duties, tariffs, and excise taxes.35
As noted above, federal taxation of income began during the Civil War
and continued intermittently until becoming permanent with ratification
of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.36
In response to the State’s ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment,
Congress, as noted above, swiftly enacted the Revenue Act of 1913.37 A
key element is that Congress mainly carried over language from its prior
tax administration.38 Under the prior system, because of the limited
number of taxpayers, taxpayers simply prepared lists with values.39 Tax
assessors then personally visited the taxpayers to determine the
correctness of the taxpayers’ lists.40
With the establishment of income tax, however, the number of
returns ballooned.41 Importantly, taxpayers also began mailing their
returns to the Commissioner.42 The prior procedures became inadequate
to handle the increased volume and lack of personal visits.43 Many
34. New Revenue Bill Reported; May Be Law In A Month, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1918
(emphasis added).
35. U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 69 (1993) (stating that the
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment permitted income tax to replace excise taxes as the
federal government’s main source of revenue.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
37. See Revenue Act of 1913 (Underwood-Simmons Act), chs. 15-16, 38 Stat. 114
(1913).
38. Camp’s Compendium, supra at note 29, § II.A.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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taxpayers apparently took advantage of the situation by underreporting
their true tax liability.44 Consequently, the avalanche of incoming tax
returns may have caused Congress to react, or more precisely, overreact,
by increasing the assessment period to forever as one of the means to
correct inequities.
In recent times, however, technological advances have enabled the
tax monitoring system to become highly digitalized.45
Recent
developments include advances to the IRS’s Business Systems
Modernization Program that integrates e-filing, real-time data entry, and
web-based services.46 Further, the IRS’s annual assessment of its own
information technology references the progress of new technological
tools, including the Customer Account Data Engine 2 database
validation, Information Reporting and Document Matching case
management system, and the Taxpayer Advocate Service Information
System.47 These ever-expanding technologies are evidence that the IRS
does not need an unlimited window to uncover non-filings and tax fraud,
especially at the expense of garnishing an individual’s life work as in the
hypothetical scenario this Article discussed in the introduction.
3. Populist Concerns
The final major factor attributable to the creation of the “at any
time” provision is more speculative. Populism, led by major figures
such as Williams Jennings Bryan, was active at the time.48 For instance,
“[w]e demand a graduated income tax” was a demand in 1892 of the

44. Id.
45. Joe Taylor Jr., 5 Tips for Digitizing Small Business Tax Receipts, SMALL BUSINESS
COMPUTING (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.smallbusinesscomputing.com/tipsforsmallbusiness/
5-tips-for-digitizing-small-business-tax-receipts.html.
46. RICHARD J. DURBIN ET AL., BUSINESS SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION: INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE’S FISCAL YEAR 2011 EXPENDITURE PLAN 49-50 (United States
Government
Accountability
Office
Oct.
2011),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585642.pdf.
47. MICHAEL E. MCKENNEY ET AL., ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 21-23 (TIGTA Sep. 30, 2014),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2014reports/201420095fr.pdf
(highlighting specifically, the IRDM Case Management System was implemented to narrow
the tax gap by requiring third party payors, to submit information returns to the IRS to report
income earned by businesses on merchant payment cards and the cost basis for securities
transactions).
48. SAMUEL E. MORISON ET AL., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:
VOLUME 1, 446 (1970) (running on the Populist and Democrat lines, Bryan lost to William
McKinley, but still garnered 46.8 percent of the popular vote in the 1896 presidential
campaign).
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Populist party.49 Further, from a vertical equity standpoint, the wealthy
are more likely to have sufficient assets or significant income to
surreptitiously transfer than moderate or low net worth individuals.
Whether these considerations were an important influence at the time is
only conjecture, but remains a possibility.
II. DEFINITIONS OF EQUITABLE AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON
ACTIONS
This section provides definitions for pertinent equitable canons and
statutory laws pertaining to limitations of actions. The purpose of these
definitions is to provide a foundation for the discussion that this Article
later provides.
A. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is an equitable doctrine that arose from the
principle that “[t]he King can do no wrong.”50 The King or Sovereign
was therefore immune from suits for injuries the Sovereign may have
caused.51
American jurisprudence adopted sovereign immunity.
The
principle “is elementary that ‘the United States, as sovereign, is immune
from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to
be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the
suit.’”52 Further, courts continue to enforce sovereign immunity.53
Notwithstanding, the United States republic seeks as an ideal the
consent of the governed to guard against wrongdoings that the Sovereign
might impose.54 Congress has slowly loosened the Sovereign’s strict

49. 26 CONG. REC. APP. 601 (Jan. 30, 1894) (statement by Rep. Lafe Pence, PopulistCO).
50. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 246 (Garland
Publ’g 1978) (“The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of
thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness”).
51. Joseph Mack, Nullum Tempus: Governmental Immunity to Statutes of Limitation,
Laches, and Statutes of Repose, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 180, 185 (Apr. 2006); Stanwood R. Duval,
Sovereign Immunity, Anachronistic or Inherent: A Sword or a Shield?, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1471,
1472 (2010).
52. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,538 (1980) (citations omitted).
53. Sarah L. Brinton, Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, 54 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 237, 239 (2014) (citing John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant? 87 NW. U. L. REV.
1121, 1126 (1993) for the proposition that “the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is
unquestionably alive and well today”).
54. Id. at p. 238 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, § 95
(Broadview Press 2015) (1989) (explaining that securing a civil society requires consent of the
governed)).
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infallibility.55 Significant waivers of sovereign immunity include the
Judiciary Act of 1799, which Congress enacted to ensure that citizens
were not’ “subjected to the inconvenience of unwarranted and untimely
law suits instigated by the government.”56 Other official waivers of
sovereign immunity were the Tucker Act in 1887, the Federal Tort
Claims Act in 1946, and the Administrative Procedures Act, also in
1946.57 Further, critics continue to challenge sovereign immunity as
inappropriate for today’s large administrative bureaucracy.58
The above waivers evidence that when good cause exists, the crown
does waive its claim to sovereign immunity to protect the interests of
individual citizens. The matter of unlimited prosecution of tax
investigations is another area in which the government must waive its
unlimited power over its citizens.
B. Quad Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi
A close offshoot to sovereign immunity, and directly applicable to
the matter at hand, is the equitable doctrine of quod nullum tempus
occurrit regit (hereinafter nullum tempus).59 “No time runs against the

55. George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13
LA. L. REV. 476, 492 (1953).
56. Judiciary Act of 1799, ch. 22, § 89, 1 Stat. 695 (1799).
57. Brinton, supra note 55, at 250 (explaining that The Tucker Act, Mar. 3, 1887, ch.
359, 24 Stat. 505, 505, waived sovereign immunity by granting the U.S. Court of Claims the
authority to decide contract, constitutional, and other non-tort money claims against the
United States); Id. at 249-250 (the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982, 983-85
(1948), waived sovereign immunity for injured citizens to sue the federal government for
tortious acts by federal employees, in response to a U.S. military aircraft smashing into the
Empire State Building); Id. at 250 (explaining that The Administrative Practices Act, ch. 324,
60 Stat. 237 (1946), enabled suits against the U.S. if an agency action caused a legal injury to
a person, amended in 1976 to make the waiver definitive).
58. Pugh, supra note 55, at 494 (1953), which concluded that with respect to sovereign
immunity:
Thus the matter rests-a confused, conflicting, but tenacious acceptance of an
outmoded and undemocratic dogma. Perhaps it is now too late for the court to
make a volte face, and completely reject the doctrine-as historically, theoretically
and practically unsound and undesirable. Nevertheless, corrective legislation is
needed-legislation which would combine and integrate our present law, and
eliminate the quirks and injustices that must characterize a hodge-podge,
sporadic legislative process. . . . The courts might use as their guide the phrase
inextricably linked with the history of English attempts to evade the tentacles of
the immunity concept-’Let right be done!
See also former Justice John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 1121,
1126 (1993), for the proposition that sovereign immunity is in reality a “judge-made doctrine”
that deposits seeds of injustice.
59. Mack, supra note 61..
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king” is the literal translation.60 Nullum tempus exempts the Sovereign
from laches and from statutes of limitations that bind ordinary private
parties.61 The IRC’s current unlimited time to assess tax mirrors this
doctrine.62
Nullum tempus shares a common heritage with sovereign
immunity.63 In 1938, however, the Supreme Court articulated a separate
purpose for nullum tempus, as follows:
The true reason, indeed, why the law has determined, that there can
be no negligence or laches imputed to the crown, and, therefore, no
delay should bar its right, though sometimes asserted to be, because
the king is always busied for the public good, and, therefore, has not
leisure to assert his right within the times limited to subjects is to be
found in the great public policy of preserving the public rights,
revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of
64
public officers.

Notwithstanding the laudable goal of protecting the public purse,
that goal does not mean the government should have unlimited time to
prosecute its claims. Competing interests can outweigh the financial
ones. For instance, critics of nullum tempus express concerns similar to
the following principle: “[a] similar balancing of interests leads to the
conclusion that nullum tempus should be abandoned. Statutes of
limitation should be permitted to fulfill their primary function: protection
of defendants from stale claims.”65
60. Id.
61. U.S. v. Hoar, 26 Fed. Cas. 329, 330 (1821) (proposing that “no statute of limitations
has been held to apply to actions brought by the crown, unless there has been an express
provision including it. For it is said, that, where a statute is general, and thereby any
prerogative, right, title, or interest is divested or taken from the king, in such case the king
shall not be bound, unless the statute is made by express words to extend to him. Bac. Abr.
‘Prerogative,’ E. 5”). See Case of Magdalen College, 11 Cooke, 68, 74b, 1 Rolle, 151,
(explaining that ‘the king has a prerogative, quod nullum tempus occurrit regi, and, therefore,
the general acts of limitation or of plenarty, shall not extend to him.’”); U.S. v. Kirkpatrick, 22
U.S. 720, 735 (1824); Guaranty Trust Co. of NY v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938). Cf. U.S.
v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that the United States
is not bound by state statutes of limitation or subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its
rights”).
62. As noted throughout this Article, IRC § 6501(c) allows the Commissioner in certain
instances to assess a tax “at any time.” 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c) (2014).
63. Mack, supra note 51.
64. U.S. v. Hoar, 26 Fed. Cas. 329, 330 (1821); Guaranty Trust Co. of NY v. U.S., 304
U.S. 126,132 (1938).
65. Thomas A. Bowden, Sovereign Immunity from Statutes of Limitation in Maryland,
46 MD. L. REV. 408, 413 (1987). See Sigmund D. Schutz, Time to Reconsider Nullum
Tempus Occurrit Regi—The Applicability of Statutes of Limitations Against the State of Maine
in Civil Actions, 55 ME. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003) (stating that the doctrine of nullum tempus is
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In a similar critical vein, “the nullum tempus doctrine likewise [to
sovereign immunity] has grossly inequitable and unjust effects . . . [t]he
fundamental injustice caused by the nullum tempus doctrine is that it
renders the public forever vulnerable to a suit by the State for long past
conduct or omissions.”66 The untenable situation of citizens being
vulnerable, forever, to the Sovereign’s whip or whim is one of the prime
reasons to enact a limitation on tax assessments.
C. Laches
Laches is another pertinent equitable principle. Laches decides
whether the injured party acted within a reasonable time in filing a
claim.67 The goal is to avoid prejudicing the defendant from a plaintiff’s
unreasonable delay.68 Accordingly, the concept of laches is highly
relevant here.
The law’s currently unlimited period for tax
investigations is susceptible to the Executive bringing claims after the
parties have lost or purposely destroyed relevant documents. The
crown’s claims can arise late in the taxpayer’s life or even after the
individual’s death. Because laches, however, provides an equitable
relief, and because statutory law governs most tax disputes, tax
petitioners must rely instead on statutory relief, as discussed below.69
Statutory relief does not preclude the application of the reasoning
behind the equitable relief of laches to the issue at hand. The goal is to
ensure that laws do not forever burden citizens with the fear of being the
target of a government investigation.
“ripe for abrogation”). See also State of So. Carolina v. City of Columbia, 339 S.C. 8, 18, 528
S.E.2d 408. 413 (2000) (citing Shootman v. Dep’t of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200, 1203-1205
(Colo.1996) and New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen Partnership, 125 N.J. 66, 592
A.2d 559, 561 (1991) for the agreement of the Supreme Court of South Carolina with the
Colorado and New Jersey courts that the abolition of sovereign immunity in those states also
removed the underlying purpose for the related doctrine of nullum tempus). Cf. Mack, supra
note 51, at 180 (countering that nullum tempus has an increasingly important role in helping
state attorneys general recover for slow to discover mass tort harms, including tobacco, lead
paint, and firearm products).
66. Schutz, supra note 65, at 384-85.
67. Mack, supra note 51, at 183.
68. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002) “(‘[A] party may
not be ‘entitled’ to relief if its conduct of the cause has improperly and substantially
prejudiced the other party. In such cases, the federal courts have the discretionary power to
“to locate ‘a just result’ in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case” (citations omitted)).
69. Comm’r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (“The Tax Court is a court of limited
jurisdiction and lacks general equitable powers.” (citations omitted)); Cohen v. Comm’r, 139
T.C. 299, 303 (USTC 2012) (“This [U.S. Tax] Court, however, is not a court of equity and
does not provide for equitable relief.” (citations omitted)). Although Redstone and other
taxpayers are generally petitioners and not defendants, they are in substance defending a tax
position that the Commissioner has disputed.
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D. Statutes of Repose
Statutes of repose are a statutory response to laches in that they
serve to protect potential defendants from delayed lawsuits.70 Statutes of
repose prevent litigation after a statutorily defined period regardless
whether the potential plaintiff had yet discovered or suffered the injury.71
Service or product providers, such as architects, builders, or
manufacturers, might otherwise be liable decades later for negligence,
tort, or product liability.72 Many important economic activities might
slow or cease because of the near endless potential liability.73
Accordingly, more than forty-five states have enacted statutes of
repose.74 Pertinent to this discussion, statutes of repose tend to provide
longer spans than statutes of limitation.75 Statutes of repose generally
limit actions to ten years.76
The doctrine of repose is directly applicable to the case of the
hypothetical business owner that this Article described in the
introduction. Congress should extend similar repose to tax matters to
protect ordinary citizens from the Executive garnishing their life’s work.
This legislature should adopt the reasoning behind statutes of repose not
only to protect the individual citizen, but also to free the citizenry’s
ability to partake in economic activities without the need to protect
against potential claims the government might bring decades after error
had occurred. This would further policy aims of economic growth.
E. Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations date back at least as far as Roman law.77
Later, in 1236 in England, “statutes were enacted prohibiting real
property actions if they were based on a seisin [fee simple] prior to a
given date, such as the coronation of Henry II.”78 England continued
similarly with the Limitations Act of 1623.79 The Limitations Act set
distinct limitations on actions beginning with when the certain act
70. Mack, supra note 51, at 183-184.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law—Statutes of
Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1950) (citing Sohm, The Institutes of Roman Law 318-22
(Ledlie’s transl., 3d ed. 1907)).
78. Id. (citing 2 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law 81 (2d ed. 1898)).
79. Id. (citing Limitations Act, 1623, 21 JAC. 1, c. 16).
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occurred, equivalent to a statute of repose discussed above.80
Similar to statutes of repose, the purpose of statutes of limitations is
to set a period after which the injured party can no longer commence a
lawsuit.81 Main reasons for the implementation of a statute of limitations
include protecting defendants from stale claims, judicial economy, and
to exclude dilatory plaintiffs.82 Although overlapping with statutes of
repose, the difference is the statutes of limitations, at least originally,
sought to cutoff a lawsuit from the time of the original transaction or
harm.83 In contrast, statutes of response, as noted above, sought to cutoff
litigation from the potentially long delayed discovery of the injury.84
The Supreme Court has succinctly summarized the rationales for
statutes of limitations, as follows:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and
convenience, rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather
than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare
the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being
put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or
disappeared, and evidence has been lost. They are, by definition,
arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just
85
and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and unavoidable delay.

In summary, statutes of limitations, while arbitrary and imperfect,
serve an important role in the judicial system. As the Supreme Court
stated above, legislatures implement a statute of limitation out of
necessity to protect defendants from defending against purported injuries
that challenge faded memories and lost records. Thus, the aim of
statutes of limitations is not to set the guilty free, but to serve justice by
ensuring that plaintiffs do not bring claims against which a defendant
cannot properly defend. Consequently, to preserve the integrity of the
judicial system, Congress must limit the Executive’s time to prosecute
claims of fraud, false filing, and non-filing of tax returns.
III. REASONS FOR AND AGAINST A FINITE ASSESSMENT PERIOD
Below are the major pros and cons for enacting a limitations period.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Mack, supra note 51, at 181.
Id. at 181-82
Id. at 181.
Id. at 183-84.
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313-314 (1945).
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A. Against a Limitation
This subsection analyzes the factors against enacting a limitations
period on assessments.
1. Preserving Confidence in the Voluntary Tax System
Perhaps the number one reason against enacting a limitation is the
concept that under the volunteer tax system, taxpayers want to have
confidence that the rest of the citizenry, especially the well-to-do, cannot
easily cheat the system.86 In other words, from a fairness or vertical
equity standpoint, the highest concern is that the largest undisclosed
transfers or biggest fraud would likely arise from people or businesses
with the most income or wealth to hide.87
Echoing the above sentiments, co-commentators wrote favorably of
the open-ended assessment period that unpinned Redstone.88 After
recapitulating the facts of the case, the commentators provided the
following conclusion:
Although it may seem unfair for the IRS to look back over 40 years
at a transaction, in this instance the IRS has every right to do so. If a
gift tax return is never filed, the IRS has an unlimited amount of time
to proceed. As unhappy as it may make taxpayers, an open-ended
statute of limitations in cases of nondisclosure is key to the integrity
of a self-reporting system like the gift tax. The rules apply to
89
Sumner Redstone as equally as to other taxpayers.

In counterpoint, this Article contends that equipping the
Commissioner with an unlimited time to prosecute claims undermines
the aims of equity that the open-ended writ seeks to protect. The
unlimited window allows the Commissioner to investigate cases by
whatever means, at whatever time, and by whichever priorities the
Executive sees fit. This unbound writ leads to mounds of concern
related to arbitrary and capricious prosecutions. For instance, the
observer can never know what truly motivated the government to
prosecute Redstone 40 years later, whether it was his wealth, jealously,
86. See Couch v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (the tax system is “largely dependent
upon honest self-reporting”); Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943) (stating that in
the era before income tax withholding the tax “system can function successfully only if those
within and near taxable income keep and render true accounts”).
87. From a definitional standpoint, the principle of horizontal equity ensures that
similarly situated taxpayers are responsible for a similar proportion of tax. Vertical equity
ensures that people who earn higher income pay a proportionate increase in their tax.
88. Bridget J. Crawford & Theresa Fortin, Sumner Redstone’s 40-Year-Old Gift, Estate
and Gift Rap, TAX NOTES, Aug. 19, 2013, at 833-835.
89. Id. at 835.
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political leanings, religion, or any other factor.90
A better path would be to increase reporting requirements and
implement a stronger penalty system to discourage, deter, or detect
unreported or underreported transactions.
By requiring the
Commissioners to use tools of investigation to bring claims timely
against violators of the self-reporting tax system, society can better
achieve goals of vertical and horizontal equity without the potential for
looming prejudicial suits hanging over the head of citizens and their
heirs for all eternity.
2. Facilitating Tax Fraud
Similar to the above contention, another theory against the
implementation of a limitation is that tax cheats may plan to profit, or
attempt to profit, knowing that at a foreseeable date, they will benefit
from their misdeeds. The following quotation expresses the important
axiom that a person should not benefit from intentionally committing a
misdeed:
To decide the case we need look no further than the maxim that no
man may take advantage of his own wrong. Deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence this principle has been applied in many diverse classes
of cases by both law and equity courts and has frequently been
91
employed to bar inequitable reliance on statutes of limitations.

Moreover, a similar censure toward fraud is a prevailing sentiment
in the laws, as the following Supreme Court condemnation illustrates:
The applicable principle is fundamental and unquestioned. He who
prevents a thing from being done may not avail himself of the
nonperformance which he has himself occasioned, for the law says to
him, in effect: This is your own act, and therefore you are not
damnified. Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized
as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. The label counts for little.
Enough for present purposes that the disability has its roots in a
principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, the
principle that no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon his
92
own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong.

90. Josh Gerstein, Political Affiliations of Viacom Board Could Impact CBS Case, N.Y.
SUN (Sep. 21, 2004), available at http://www.nysun.com/national/political-affiliations-ofviacom-board-could/1993/; David Marc, Sumner M. Redstone, in REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS:
ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR BUSINESS (2d ed. 2015), available at
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/biography/M-R/Redstone-Sumner-M-1923.html.
91. Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-233 (1959).
92. R.H. Stearns Co. of Boston, Mass., v. U.S., 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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This Article agrees that fraud is a repugnant matter. Similarly,
prominent tax commentators have expressed concern that the current
system for reporting gifts leaves wide gaps that taxpayers can easily
exploit.93 The existence of gaps, however, does not justify the use of
unlimited time to investigate these acts. Instead, Congress and the
Executive should consider reorganizing gift tax reporting requirements
to more effectively fight against specific instances of fraud.
In particular, the Commissioner has even more powerful tools
unimaginable one hundred years ago when Congress first enacted the
limitless decree. For instance, the Sovereign now has computer
matching to check reporting of SSNs for dependents, Forms W-2s for
wages, and Forms 1099 for dividends, gambling winnings, and
miscellaneous income. As a yardstick, the IRS has the largest
concentration of computer power outside the Pentagon.94 Recently, the
IRS had five times more employees than the FBI.95
Congress has already designed the Code to punish the fraudulent
taxpayer. For instance, the Code attaches a seventy-five percent penalty
to incidents of fraud as compared to a twenty percent penalty for
instances of negligence.96 Similarly, the above tax commentators
proposed stiff penalties for the non-reporting of taxable gifts.97
Likewise, this Article suggests that Congress or the Treasury could
promulgate a requirement for reporting real property transfers and a
subsequent penalty for not complying with the requirement. These steps
would not prevent or catch every crook, but the number of undetected
transfers would potentially drop without holding the uncertainty of suit
over the public, similar to the small business owner this Article depicted
in the introduction. In summary, the development and use of tools
would protect against fraud such that an unlimited assessment period
would no longer have adequate justification.
3. Government Revenue Needs
No doubt the federal government needs money. Every dollar helps.
For example, the 2014 fiscal year deficit was $485 billion, with an
93. Jay A. Soled, Paul L. Caron, Charles Davenport, Rethinking the Penalty for the
Failure to File Gift Tax Returns, TAX NOTES, Nov. 18, 2013, at 757.
94. Robert D. Hershey Jr., I.R.S. Chief Faces Task of Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1990, at F23, col. 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/04/business/ your-taxesirs-chief-faces-task-of-rebuilding.html.
95. DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS AND THE IRS 16, 79
(1989).
96. Avoiding Penalties and the Tax Gap, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/
Avoiding-Penalties-and-the-Tax-Gap (last updated Aug. 20, 2010).
97. Soled, supra note 93, at 760.
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accumulated debt at the end of the year of $16.7 trillion.98
Notwithstanding, the amount collected from late government
investigations is likely to be small. Currently, transfer taxes, which
include gift, estate, and generation skipping taxes, account for less than
two percent of federal gross domestic product.99 The foregone revenue
after a prudent limitations period and a stronger enforcement program is
likely to be further insignificant. For instance, even the three million
dollar potential collection in the Redstone case will probably yield a de
minimis or even a negative financial return to the federal government
after considering expenditures on investigation, prosecution, and judicial
resources. Similarly, from the citizen’s standpoint, consider the
hypothetical this Article posed at the beginning. For not having paid a
$153 FICA tax in one year, and similar amounts in the next two years,
the IRS subjected the business owner to garnishment of his entire life’s
work. These kinds of penalties do not justify the Treasury’s de minimis
forgone revenue because of a person’s senility.
Thus, here too perspective needs to apply. One must recognize
tradeoffs, such that “[a]s statutes of limitation are applied in the field of
taxation, the taxpayer sometimes gets advantages and at other times the
Government gets them. Both hardships to the taxpayers and losses to the
revenues may be pointed out.”100 In pointing out these advantages and
disadvantages, it is clear that the Treasury’s de minimis at best financial
benefits are not substantial enough to place a constant threat of suit on
the populace through the implementation of unlimited prosecutorial
power.
B. In Favor of a Limitation
This subsection analyzes the key factors that favor a limitation on
assessments.
1. Violation of Constitutional Protections
An in-depth examination of constitutional law is beyond the scope
of this Article. Nonetheless, unlimited intrusions by the Sovereign may
violate fundamental constitutional rights of procedural and/or
98. See Historical Tables, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, Tables 1.1 and 7.1,
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals.
99. An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, 23 (Aug. 2014), available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45653OutlookUpdate_2014_Aug.pdf (stating that combined revenue from “excise taxes, estate and
gift, taxes, customs duties, remittances from the Federal Reserve, and miscellaneous fees and
fines,” totaled 1.6 percent of gross domestic product for 2014).
100. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1946).
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substantive due process. These rights encapsulate nearly all, or all, of
the succeeding reasons in favor of implementing a reasonable
prosecution period. The Supreme Court has explained these crucial
constitutional protections as follows:
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
liberty it protects includes more than the absence of physical
restraint. Due Process Clause protects individual liberty against
certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them. The Clause also provides
heightened protection against government interference with certain
101
fundamental rights and liberty interests.

Thus, the unlimited assessment period causes serious concern about
the government’s constitutional overreach because the statute does not
narrowly tailor the unlimited time on when the Commissioner can bring
a claim against deficiencies arising from fraud, nonfiling, or false
returns.102 By allowing the unlimited writ, the courts and Congress have
endangered the citizenry’s fundamental right to demanding that the state
not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Because the law does not narrowly tailor the limitations period, the
courts must examine the law by strict scrutiny to determine whether the
interests of the Treasury are a compelling state interest that outweighs
the individual citizen’s right to due process.
This Article contends that the interest of the King’s fisc does not
outweigh the interest of the individual citizen in being free from
perputual threat of the Sovereign’s claims. As the Twersky case showed,
not even the state’s compelling interest in protecting against perpetrators
of childhood sexual molestation justify the implementation of an
unlimited prosecution period.103

101. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-21 (1997) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
102. Michael Cohn, U.S. Sued for Seizure of Tax Refunds to Settle Old Social Security
Overpayments, ACCOUNTING TODAY (Feb. 18, 2015), https://fairtax.org/articles/u-s-sued-forseizure-of-tax-refunds-to-settle-old-social-security-overpayments (explaining that ‘[i]n recent
years, both the SSA and the Treasury Department amended their regulations to revoke a
limitations period that had prevented the government from offsetting tax refunds to collect
overpayment debts more than 10 years old.”). This too is a violation of the principles of
judicial and economic efficiency, as often, citizens spend their tax returns, and thus stimulate
the economy, with purchases made with their tax refunds. Additionally, because this money is
often spent, it is not available beyond ten years to be recollected. It is also unjust to demand
such a payment.
103. Twersky v. Yeshiva University, 579 Fed. App’x. 7 (2nd Cir. 2014), aff’d 993 F.
Supp. 2d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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2. Finality
Finality is an indispensable principle of justice. After a certain
time, almost all matters, except for murder and harms of similar
magnitude, to which financial claims do not rise, should end. Citizens
should be able to turn their gaze forward. The Supreme Court has
encapsulated this fundamental maxim with respect to taxes through the
following holding in Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.104 In
Rothensies, the Court declared the importance of a limitations period in
the event of a recoupment of tax paid by a taxpayer who, it was
eventually determined, overpaid his tax obligation:
It probably would be all but intolerable, at least Congress has
regarded it as ill-advised, to have an income tax system under which
there never would come a day of final settlement and which required
both the taxpayer and the Government to stand ready forever and a
day to produce vouchers, prove events, establish values and recall
details of all that goes into an income tax contest. Hence a statute of
limitation is an almost indispensable element of fairness as well as of
105
practical administration of an income tax policy.

Although the court was discussing a claim of recoupment of taxes
paid, there is no overwhelming evidence that contradicts the application
of this reasoning to the implementation of a limit on investigations into
tax deficiencies. The Court further asserted that statutes of limitations
are “designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”106
Had Congress or the Executive previously applied the principle of
finality, then, in cases similar to that of the hypothetical business owner,
the Commissioner would not have been able to seize all of the
defendant’s wealth because of simple errors. In summary, the principle
of finality is an indispensable instrument of justice.
3. Proportionality with Other Limitations
As noted at the outset of this Article, even molestation of high
school students has a limitations period.107 In the criminal realm,
104. Rothensies, 329 U.S. at 301-02 (1946). See also, Chertkof v. United States, 676
F.2d 984, 991 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating that “[o]ne must, after expiration of a fixed period, be
able to know that a matter is over and done with”); Steven J. Willis, Some Limits of Equitable
Recoupment, Tax Mitigation, and Res Judicata: Reflections Prompted by Chertkof v.
United States, 38 TAX LAW 625 (Spring 1985).
105. Rothensies, 329 U.S. at 301.
106. Id.
107. See Twersky, 579 Fed. App’x. 7, aff’d 993 F. Supp. 2d 42.
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generally only murder carries an open-ended prosecution period.108
Otherwise, prosecution of even the most heinous crimes such as
manslaughter or rape of a child carries a limitations period.109 Likewise,
financial crimes by government officials carry a finite prosecution
period.110
Applicable here, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 provides the default limitations
period on civil government actions. The statute, entitled, “[t]ime for
commencing proceedings,” provides the following limitation:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or
forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless
commenced within five years from the date when the claim first
accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is
found within the United States in order that proper service may be
111
made thereon.

The background to the statute is as follows:
For nearly two centuries, section 2462 and its predecessors have
provided a catch-all statute of limitations that applies to certain
actions initiated by the federal government. The origins of the
present version of title 28, section 2462 of the United States Code
date back to the Judiciary Act of 1799. In the Judiciary Act of 1799,
Congress moved away from the rule of sovereign immunity and
subjected the federal government to statutory limitations periods.
The language of the statute of limitations has changed over the years,
but the basic purpose of maintaining an equitable system of
government has remained the same. Congress did not want citizens
to be subjected to the inconvenience of unwarranted and untimely
112
lawsuits instigated by the government.

108. For example, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277 § 63 (2012) (“an indictment for
murder may be found at any time”).
109. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277 § 13B (2012) (stating that in Massachusetts the
government has twenty-seven years to indict for manslaughter). Id. § 22A (stating that in
Massachusetts the government has twenty-seven years to indict for rape of a child).
110. Id. § 17 (stating that in Massachusetts the government has ten years to indict for
improper receipt of a gift/bribe); Id. § 19 (stating that in Massachusetts the government has 10
years to indict for having a financial self-interest in a government matter).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2014).
112. Edward J. Carroll, III, Note, Mullikin v. United States: “Big Brother” Is Still
Watching; The IRS Can Assess Penalties at any Time, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 181, 185-86
(1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1978) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)) (originally Pub.L. 80-773, 62 Stat. 974 (1948)); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6501(a), (b)(1), (c)(1)(3)(9), (e)(1) (2010); Judiciary Act of 1799, ch. 22, § 89, 1 Stat. 695 (1799); Mullikin v.
United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), 85,304, 85,306 (E.D.Ky.1990), rev’d, 952 F.2d 920
(6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992).
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This Article concurs strongly that a limitations period is imperative
to prevent unwarranted and untimely lawsuits by the government. For
instance, a shorter period would have prevented the government’s
intrusion in Redstone and in the hypothetical scenario at the start of this
Article.
4. The Decline of Tax Exceptionalism
Tax exceptionalism is the concept that administrating tax law is
above all other areas of administrative law and therefore requires greater
deference.113 This concept is under serious reconsideration. For
instance, on February 21, 2014, the Duke Law Journal hosted its Forty
Fourth Annual Administrative Law Symposium entitled “Taking
Administrative Law to Tax,” which focused on whether tax
exceptionalism is still relevant after three recent Supreme Court
decisions.114
If tax law is no different from other administrative law, then
harmonizing the limitations period with other administrative limits
makes strong sense. As noted above, the 5-year limitation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462 is the default statute for financial claims by the federal
government.115 For the reasons stated below, five years appears to be
too brief a time, but the current unlimited period is far too long. This
Article suggests that if tax revenues are not fundamentally different from
any other government receipt, then this circumstance provides another
reason why an unlimited period to assess is inappropriate. The harms
attendant to unlimited time to investigate tax deficiencies are identical if
not more unsettling than claims brought to prosecute other financial
crimes. As evidenced by the hypothetical posed by this Article and the
Redstone case, citizens subject to tax investigation under the unlimited
decree may not commit errors out of deceit, but because of simple error,
113. Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court
Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 222-24 (2014).
114. Duke Law Journal’s 44th Annual Administrative Law Symposium (Feb. 21, 2014).
The Symposium’s announcement provided the following explanation: “Duke Law Journal’s
44th Annual Administrative Law Symposium will focus on the vigorous debate about the
proper relationship between tax administration and general administrative law. The Supreme
Court alone has considered the interplay of tax and administrative law three times in the last
two years. National Federation of Independent Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(reshaping the relationship of the Anti-Injunction Act to APA suits); United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (reshaping Brand X in ways similar to how
Mead reshaped Chevron); Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United
States, 131 S.Ct. 704 (2011) (reshaping judicial review of tax regulations by rejecting claims
that tax regulations were subject to tax-specific precedent rather than Chevron deference).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1978) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)) (originally Pub.L. 80-773, 62 Stat. 974 (1948)).
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lack of knowledge, or genuine disagreement regarding the taxability of
certain transactions.
5. Preventing Stale Claims
As the case of United States v. Kubrick, illustrates, “the right to be
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them.”116 The government’s interest in preventing stale claims is
connected with the interest of preserving judicial economy and
upholding justice.117
Likewise, allowing stale claims denies justice, as follows:
Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in their
conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within
the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in
118
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.

Similar sentiments of unfairness include the following: “‘Long
delays by the government in instituting suit, of course, cause harm to the
defendant and are in the interest of no one.’”119 Likewise, “‘[l]ong
dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them.’”120
For example, the government stripped the elderly business owner
depicted at the beginning of this Article of nearly all his earthly wealth
because of recording errors that originally began by depriving the
Treasury of only $153. The disproportion in amount due versus
penalties collected provides an important depiction of how the
imposition of an exceedingly old claim can cause more cruelty than
justice. Further, in the Redstone case, if he were to unfortunately pass,
his heirs would be left to answer for an exorbitant penalty because of a
substantive disagreement in whether gift tax applied to a transfer of
stock to trusts that Redstone timely reported on the pertinent corporate
tax return.
116. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
117. Carroll, supra note 112, at 201..
118. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117; Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-349 (1944).
119. South Carolina ex rel. Condon v. Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408, 414 (S.C. 2000)
(citing Shootman v. Dep’t of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Colo. 1996)).
120. Bowden, supra note 65, at 413 (1987) (citing A’Court v. Cross, 130 Eng. Rep.
540, 541 (1825), for the observation that “statutes of limitation address the defendant’s
overriding need for access to evidence, including live testimony, before it is lost, destroyed, or
forgotten”).
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6. Spurring the Sovereign’s Timeliness
The government should not sleep on its claims.
Subjecting government to limitations would promote justice by
eliminating stale claims, which force the courts to render judgments
based on unreliable evidence. Surely, if government can survive
responsibility for negligent acts and breaches of contract on the part
of its truck drivers, health care workers, and procurement officers,
then government can survive responsibility for failures to timely file
121
lawsuits on the part of its litigators.

In the end, this Article agrees with the sentiment that
“‘[r]esponsibility on the part of the Crown does not involve its
degradation; it is nothing more than the obvious principle that in a
human society acts involve consequences and consequences involve
obligation[s].’”122 The law should not burden the general citizen with
fear of potential claims that the Executive may bring for tax deficiencies
simply because the IRS did investigate claims in a timely manner.
Further, timelier investigations may promote confidence in the tax
system in a vertical and horizontal equity sense as citizens see justice
executed promptly.
7. Administrative and Judicial Economy
Pursuing old claims distracts the Commissioner from easier to audit
current transactions, and clogs up the courts with old matters. As noted
above, the purpose of the 28 U.S.C. § 2462 statute is as follows:
Not only is it clear from the legislative history of section 2462 that
Congress sought to impose time restraints on the federal government
for penalty proceedings, but it is also clear that Congress believed
statutes of limitations against the government are necessary for a just
123
and efficient system of government.

Allowing the Executive to pursue stale claims also consumes
valuable judicial resources that government could use to adjudicate
justice. Based on the de minimis returns that section V(A)(3) of this
Article explores, the public’s interest would be better served by the
Commissioner pursuing current deficiencies as opposed to investigating
stale transactions that occurred decades earlier.

121. Id. at 429-30.
122. Pugh, supra note 55, at 492, n.68 (quoting from Laski, Responsibility of the State
in England, 32 HARV. L. REV. 447, 451-452 (1919)).
123. Carroll, supra note 112, at 201; S.REP. NO. 363, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1826, 1832.

KOFSKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

290

8/4/15 8:21 AM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:265

8. Discouraging Arbitrary Assessments
Allowing an unlimited assessment period opens the door to
selective prosecution. This is not to cast aspersions on the IRS, the
Commissioner, or any other government servant. It is just a simple
statement that humans are fallible. Allowing unlimited assessment time
may enable government agents to pursue political or personal goals. The
current controversy over the IRS’s handling of not-for-profit tax
exemption requests of conservative groups is an example.124
Moreover, as the IRS faces budget cuts it is increasingly important
that the Services use its limited resources in the most efficient manner
possible.125 By pursuing tax deficiencies caused by fraud, false filing,
and non-filings that occurred outside of 21 years the IRS is expending
efforts for de minimis gain.126 Maintaining an unlimited statute of
limitations in the aforementioned instances is directly encouraging the
assessment of arbitrary claims that have long since gone stale.
IV. AUTHOR’S PROPOSAL
After balancing the above pros and cons, the Author strongly
believes that limiting the Sovereign’s temporal reach to twenty-one years
would be a wise first step, for the following reasons.
Considering Congress’s default limitations of five years on
government actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2462, this Article
recommends a long-term goal of a three year, five year, and ten year
assessment regimen. This regimen would function by maintaining the
current three years to assess for regular filings, five instead of six years
for gross omissions, and ten years instead of infinite time to assess for
false, fraud, or non-filed tax returns.
Ten years also is a common limit for statues of repose, as noted
124. See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, IRS Hid Conservative Targeting Until After 2012
Presidential Election. Smidgen Corrupt?, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/12/23/irs-hid-conservative-targeting-until-after2012-presidential-election-smidgen-corrupt/ (providing a quotation from the report issued the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, entitled, The Internal Revenue
Service’s Targeting of Conservative Tax-Exempt Applicants: Report of Findings for the 113th
Congress stating as follows: “Conservative organizations were not just singled out because of
their political beliefs—they were targeted by IRS officials and employees who expressed a
general loathing toward them even while begrudgingly admitting that those organizations
were in compliance with the only thing the IRS should care about: the federal tax code.”).
125. Josh Hicks, White House budget: Obama wants to boost IRS funding by 18
percent, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/02/02/white-house-budget-obama-wants-to-boost-irs-funding-by18-percent/ (explaining that the IRS is currently operating under a 10 percent funding decline
since 2010 and a workforce decline of 15 percent since 2009).
126. Discussion on the Government Revenue Needs, supra section (V)(A)(3).
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above. For all the above reasons, ten years has an appeal as the eventual
upper limit.
In the interim, however, ten years seems too short as an initial
ceiling because the period would be an abrupt change from the current
unlimited time. Further, fraud is a vile matter, and cheaters can be
sophisticated. The government needs additional time to establish
procedures, enhance penalties, and additional reporting mechanisms as
discussed above. Thus, until the government has had time to implement
the administrative improvements, this Article recommends twenty-one
years as a temporary upper limit.
Twenty-one years finds its foundation in the rule against
perpetuities. The rule against perpetuities is a common law doctrine that
provides that no interest in property is valid unless it vests, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life or lives in being that existed
at the time of the creation of the interest.127 Specifically, the Crown
initial adopted this canon to protect against the remoteness of vesting
interests to promote economic and judicial efficiency, as well as to
promote free marketability of title.128 Preventing remoteness of vesting
interests is important to keep an owner of property from “unduly and
unreasonably diminishing the value of ownership to his successors.”129
Because the rule against perpetuities focuses on property, as do the
transfer taxes that form the main issue here, sharing the same timeframe
appears proper. The rule against perpetuities and the establishment of a
collar on tax investigations related to fraud, non-filings, and false returns
both serve the function of ensuring that property interests are
unencumbered. Thus, limiting the king’s time bring these claims
furthers general principles of economic participation, growth, and
prosperity. Additionally, twenty-one years also approximates one
generation of time, which also seems an appropriate analogy in an effort
to avoid liability to transferees of a taxpayer’s estate upon death.
No one target can be perfect. A statute of limitation or repose is a
balancing act. Nonetheless, 21 years as the initial limit seems to be a
good compromise first step, with a foundation in the common law of
property.

127. 61 AM. JUR. 2D PERPETUITIES AND RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION TO PLANT AND
JOB SAFETY— OSHA AND STATE LAW § 35 (2012).
128. Burt v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 260 S.E.2d 306 (1979).
129. Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., Leases and the Rule against Perpetuities, 27 YALE L.J. 878,
885-86 (May, 1918) (discussing the policy justifications behind the Rule against Perpetuities).
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V. THE ILLUSTRATIVE CASE OF REDSTONE V. COMMISSIONER
This Section provides a detailed review of the case of Redstone v.
Commissioner.130 As of the time of this writing, the case had not yet
reached a conclusion. Regardless of the outcome, however, the case
provides a prime example of the larger issues that this Article raises.
A. Summary of the Facts of Redstone
The facts of the Redstone case help illustrate the evidentiary and
fairness issues that compromise the integrity of any prosecution that
takes place too many years after the underlying events have occurred.
Below is a summary of the facts of Redstone.
1. Business Inception
Michael (Mickey) and Belle Redstone had two sons.131 One was
Sumner, the taxpayer at bar here, born around 1924.132 The other was
Sumner’s younger brother, Edward. 133 Starting around 1938, Mickey
began buying land on which Mickey constructed drive-in movie theaters.
Mickey formed three corporations for each site.134 One corporation
received title to the real estate, another managed refreshments, and the
third operated the theater.135 Edward and Sumner joined the business in
1952, and 1954, respectively.136
2. Initial Capital Accounts
In 1959, Mickey formed a new corporation, National Amusements,
Inc. (NAI).137 Mickey made an initial capital contribution of $3,000.00
to NAI.138 NAI served as a holding company for more than thirty movie
theater corporations that the Redstones had created.139 Mickey, Sumner,
and Edward were the directors and officers of NAI.140 At an initial
board meeting, the directors authorized the issuance of up to 300 shares
130. Amended Petition, supra note 7, at 13 .
131. Id. at 3-4. Sumner was age 89 as of the date of the Original Petition filed on Apr.
10, 2013, Petitioner provided a nearly identical recitation of the facts in his Pretrial
Memorandum as he listed in his amended petition. The authors have chosen for consistency
to cite the facts mainly from the Amended Petition, which Redstone filed two weeks after his
Pretrial Memorandum.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 5, 12.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id. at 5, 7.
140. Id. at 5-6.
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of Class A stock.141
Soon after, the three Redstones made disproportionate capital
contributions to NAI.142 The resulting capital ownership percentages
were 47.9%, 26.5%, and 25.6% for Mickey, Sumner, and Edward,
respectively.143
NAI did not deliver the stock certificates to
144
shareholders.
3. Sumner’s Rise
Toward the end of the 1960s, Mickey began easing out of the
business.145 In 1968, Mickey retired to Florida.146 Also in 1968, through
a series of issuances, cancellations, and endorsements of stock
certificates, Mickey transferred fifty shares of NAI stock to a trust that
Mickey created for the benefit of Mickey’s four grandchildren.147
Sumner and Edward had two children’s each.148
During these years, a respected international accounting firm, J.K.
Lasser & Company (J.K. Lasser), was the tax advisor to NAI and to the
Redstone family.149 J.K. Lasser prepared gift tax returns for Mickey’s
transfer of NAI stock in 1968 to the trust for the grandchildren.150
In 1969, Mickey redeemed his other 50 Class A shares.151 As
Mickey’s role diminished, Sumner became the leader of NAI.152
4. Edward’s Litigation
Edward grew disgruntled at his brother’s rise.153 In 1971, Edward
quit NAI but still received no NAI stock certificates.154 As an initial
capital contributor, Edward should have received his shares or the cash
equivalent.
Toward the end of 1971, Edward sued Mickey, Sumner, and
141. Id. at 6
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id. at 8.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Id. at 9.
146. Respondent’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 131, at 4.
147. Amended petition, supra note 7, at 9.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 27 (showing that eventually, J.K. Lasser was acquired by Touche Ross &
Co., which in turn merged into Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, or commonly Deloitte, a
“Big Four” public accounting firm); see Petitioner’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 131, at
24, n.3.
150. Amended petition, supra note 140, at 27.
151. Id. at 9-10.
152. Id. at 10.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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NAI.155 Edward claimed he was entitled to 100 shares of NAI Class A
stock.156
Mickey countered that because of the disproportionate capital
contributions, Sumner and Edward were each entitled to only fifty
shares.157 Mickey allegedly wanted the other 100 shares to go for the
benefit of Sumner and Edward’s children regardless how NAI had
nominally registered the shares.158 An impassioned letter from Edward’s
mother Belle emphasized Mickey’s intent to benefit the grandchildren.159
The letter pleaded with Edward that his actions were tearing apart the
family.160
5. Settlement and Stock Transfer
The parties reached a settlement in 1972.161 The settlement entitled
Edward to 66 2/3 shares.162 The settlement required one-half of those
shares, 33 1/3 Class A shares, to go into separate trusts for each of
Edward’s two children at 16 2/3 shares per trust.163 NAI redeemed
Edward’s other 33 1/3 shares for $5 million in cash to Edward.164 In
return, Edward agreed to have no further claims against NAI or the other
defendants.165
The same structure applied to Sumner.166 Accordingly, shortly
thereafter, Sumner transferred 16 2/3 Class A shares of NAI stock into
each of two trusts for his children.167
The result fulfilled Mickey’s purported original goal.168 One-half
of the NAI stock belonged to Mickey’s children: 33 1/3 shares to
Sumner and 33 1/3 shares, albeit immediately redemption of Edward’s
shares.169 The other half went into trusts for the benefit of Mickey’s four
grandchildren at 16 2/3 shares apiece.170

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 10-12.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 16, 19.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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6. No Gift Tax Returns
The firm of J.K. Lasser, still engaged as the Redstone family tax
advisor, allegedly advised Sumner and Edward that the 1972 stock
transfers to trusts for their children did not generate a gift tax liability.171
Accordingly, Sumner and Edward did not file gift tax returns for 1972.172
7. Stock Transfer Epilogue: Sumner’s Control of NAI
In 1984, NAI redeemed the shares held in trust for Edward’s
children.173 The redemption left Sumner and the trusts for Sumner’s two
children as the sole owners of NAI class A stock.174
B. Redstone’s Contentions
Sumner Redstone presented a number of legal grounds by which the
Court should reject the Commissioner’s determination.
1. Not a Taxable Gift
One main contention was that the 1972 transaction was not a
taxable gift.175 In particular, Redstone contended that the 1972 transfer
fit the ordinary course of business exception.176 Under that exception, a
transfer, even an intra-family transfer, for less than full consideration is
not a gift if the donor conducted the transaction in an arm’s length
manner as part of the regular business transaction.177
Redstone stated that he executed the 1972 transfer not in main part
as a loving gift to his children, or as an estate planning technique.178
Instead, he was complying with his father’s instructions to structure the
grandchildren’s shares in response to the litigation settlement with

171. Id. at 26-27.
172. Id. at 29. Notwithstanding, to emphasize his compliance record, Sumner noted
that he has filed thirty-three separate gift tax returns reporting taxable gifts during his lifetime.
173. Id. at 26.
174. Id. at 27 NAI became spectacularly successful under Sumner’s guidance. NAI’s
book value raced from $70 thousand in 1969, to $11 million in 1972, to $100 million 1984,
and then to $5 billion in 2006; Petitioner’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 131, at 24 as of
2014, Sumner owned 80% of NAI’s equity, which in turn controlled CBS Corporation and
Viacom, Inc; Id. Viacom’s brands included Comedy Central, MTV, Nickelodeon, and
Paramount Pictures. See VIACOM, http://www.viacom.com/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2015); See
also Forbes 400: Sumner Redstone, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2015, 11:40 AM)
http://www.forbes.com/profile/sumner-redstone/ (listing Sumner Redstone as the world’s
225th richest person, with a net worth of $6.4 billion as of Apr. 3, 2015).
175. Petitioner’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 131, at 29.
176. Id. at 29-30 (citing Treas. Regs. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) and § 25.2512-8) (internal
citations omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 31.
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Edward.179 Moreover, Sumner contended he suffered a minor loss on the
transfer, but jumped at the opportunity to gain control of NAI.180
2. Stale Claim
Another ground is highly pertinent to this Article. Redstone
contended that staleness of the litigation prejudiced his case.181
Redstone stated he was not able to locate certain key documents that
NAI or he discarded in the regular course of business.182 Similarly, the
Commissioner had discarded the documents the IRS had collected
pertaining to the 1972 transfer, as well as the files from that era
pertaining to Mickey, Sumner, Edward, and NAI.183
Moreover, almost all of Redstone’s key witnesses from the time had
died, including Redstone’s accountant from J.L. Lasser, Samuel Rosen,
and Redstone’s attorney, Louis Winer.184 Additionally, Mickey (1987),
Belle (1987), Edward’s daughter (1987), Edward’s grandson (2004) who
had briefly survived the daughter, and Edward (2011) had all passed
away.185 Memories had dimmed for the few surviving witnesses.186
3. Prior IRS Review
In a version of res judicata, double jeopardy, or laches, Redstone
contended that the Commissioner had previously investigated the 1972
gift tax issue without determining an adjustment.187 Redstone produced
a letter dated April 23, 1975, from the Commissioner’s Chief Counsel
Office referring to Redstone’s potential gift tax liability from 1971 or
1972.188 In a similar vein, Redstone stated that the Commissioner had
previously examined NAI’s corporate income tax returns for fiscal 1966
through 1973, including the year at issue, 1972.189 The corporate returns
reported changes in stock ownership.190 Likewise, the Commissioner
issued Closing Letters after examining the estate tax returns of Mickey
and Belle following their deaths in 1987.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 6, 26.
Id. at 6, 27.
Id. at 6, 7, 26, 43.
Amended Petition, supra note 7, at 4.
Petitioner’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 131, at 7.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28, 29.
Id.
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4. No Fraud
Redstone also contested the Commissioner’s determination of a
fraud penalty.191 The Commissioner accused Sumner of fraud in
willfully creating an oral trust theory to avoid paying gift tax.192 Sumner
responded that he had previously testified that his father Mickey had
created the oral trust concept to prevent Edward from selling shares
outside of the family.193 Further, Sumner contended that Mickey, not
Sumner, had inserted the oral trust language into the grandchildren’s
trust document.194
C. The Commissioner’s Response
The Commissioner provided at least two grounds to support the
determination.
1. Prior Admission
The Commissioner’s main legal contention was that Sumner had
previously admitted under oath that he, Sumner, and not Mickey, had
transferred the 33 1/3 shares of NAI stock that went into trust for
Sumner’s children.195 Per the Commissioner, under judicial estoppel,
Sumner must therefore not adopt an inconsistent position that would
create the impression that Sumner was misleading the court then or
now.196
2. Not an Ordinary Business Transaction
The Commissioner’s second main ground was that Redstone erred
in contending that the ordinary business transaction exception fit

191. Id. at 40.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Respondent’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 131, at 7-12 (showing that the
Commissioner quoted at length from a transcript of Sumner Redstone’s deposition in
O’Connor v. Redstone, 452 Mass. 537 (2008) for the proposition that Sumner, not Mickey,
owned the NAI stock at the date of transfer in 1972 and that prior litigation centered on
Edward’s children suing Sumner and Edward for breach of fiduciary duties); see Respondent’s
Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 131, at 7, n.2; see also O’Connor, 452 Mass. 537, 538
(showing that the children accused Sumner and Edward of self-dealing in 1972 and 1984 in
redeeming the NAI stock that the adults were supposed to hold for the benefit of Edward’s
children); id. at 538, 563. Ironic or prophetic to this Article, the court left open for further
proceedings the children’s claims for the 1972 redemption, but granted Sumner and Edward’s
motion for summary judgment to dismiss the children’s suit regarding the 1984 redemption
based on a six-year statute of limitations that time barred the children’s complaint.
196. See e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 170 (2010), for further
explanation of judicial estoppel.
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Sumner’s 1972 transfer of NAI stock.197 The Commissioner emphasized
that the children did not provide any consideration for the shares as one
would expect in an ordinary business transaction as opposed to a gift.198
D. Concluding Commentary on Redstone
The Redstone dispute, as noted above, had not concluded as of the
date of this writing. That circumstance is not significant for this article
because the normative merits of a limitless assessment period is not the
focus of the litigation.
CONCLUSION
Redstone serves as a prime example of the larger issues surrounding
unlimited assessments.
Redstone’s corporation had apparently
contemporaneously reported the stock transfer on its books, casting an ill
light on the Commissioner’s unclean hands. Further, Redstone and the
Commissioner had purposely destroyed or lost nearly all of their records
due to ordinary events and routine destruction cycles long before the 40
years. Moreover, nearly all of Redstone’s advisors to the transaction had
died.199 Under these circumstances, forcing a nonagenarian to litigate a
set of facts from nearly a half-century earlier is unconscionable.
A limitation on assessments would not gainsay the importance of
taxes. As Justice Holmes famously proclaimed, “[t]axes are what we
pay for civilized society. . . .”200 Further, fraud is a repugnant matter.
Regrettably, a sophisticated cheater might benefit from a limitations
period. That outcome, however, may be analogous to the criminal law
principle that society is better off to let a few guilty people go free than
to convict an innocent person.
In the biggest picture, moreover, limitations on actions serve a vital
role. Limits provide finality, prevent stale claims, and promote
administrative and judicial economy. A limitations period may even
cause the Commissioner to investigate sooner.
Moreover, humans are fallible. An open-ended license to fish is
ripe for abuse. Who knows why the IRS chose to pursue Redstone after
so many years?

197. Respondent’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 131, at 12.
198. Id.
199. Amended Petition, supra note 7, at 4.
200. See Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. CIR, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927)
(dissenting opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. engraved above the entrance of IRS
headquarters at 1111 Constitution Avenue Northwest, Washington, District of Columbia, DC
that famous quotation from Justice Holmes).
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A requirement for timeliness is especially appropriate given the
ever more powerful tools that the Sovereign possesses. The kings of old
or the Commissioner of even a few decades ago did not have the
sophisticated electronic investigative tools of today. A limitation on
investigations would provide a benefit akin to the Fourth Amendment’s
restriction on unreasonable search and seizure. For all these reasons,
limiting the Executive’s temporal reach, a so-called waiver of quad
nullum tempus occurrit regi, is a vital public policy.
A voluntary tax system needs to continue to try to curb tax fraud,
and therefore give the Commissioner time to identify that fraud.
Unlimited time to investigate, however, is simply unfair, imprudent, and
potentially dangerous. Yes, certain tax cheats may profit by a limitation
on time. However, with prompt enforcement, expanded penalties and
reporting, and ever more powerful investigative tools, long-term profit
from tax fraud may diminish.
Moreover, it is imperative to limit the Sovereign’s time for the
reasons discussed above. The reasons include finality, preventing stale
claims, administrative and judicial economy, encouraging the
Commissioner’s timeliness, harmonizing tax law with other
administrative law, and discouraging arbitrary assessments.
Balancing these interests, this Article proposes ten years as the
ultimate goal. As a prudent interim measure, however, and relying on
the rule against perpetuities, this Article recommends twenty-one years
as the upper limit for assessments. Two decades should be plenty long
enough to deter all but the most determined fraud, and more than
sufficient for the Commissioner to complete its investigations of the
ones who are not deterred.

